From the Shadows to the Front Page: State Use of Proxies for Cyber Operations
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- The cyber threat environment is increasingly complex due to the proliferation of capabilities and diversity of threat actors. This thesis explores the growth of non-state entities executing cyber operations against foreign targets on behalf of Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, and why these states elect to use them. These “cyber proxies” further obscure the environment and are utilized to conduct significant cyber-attacks, exploitations, and influence operations. Furthermore, they pose several risks to sponsoring states. Through the delegation of authority from centrally controlled government agents to non-state actors, the likelihood of information asymmetries and failures increases. I propose a framework containing four hypotheses: cyber proxies offer economic cost savings, enhanced plausible deniability benefits, greater access to skills and specializations, and finally those states that can credibly threaten cyber proxy misbehavior will be more likely to use them. Through analyzing a wide array of data sources including US government reports, statements, research from industry, think tank analyses, and notable journals, I find that the use of cyber proxies is widespread and converging among all these states. I ultimately conclude that economic costs and skills and specializations may motivate proxy use. However, the evidence does not suggest that these proxies provide enhanced plausible deniability benefits compared to government agents. Furthermore, these states all have larger degrees of internal versus external punitive power. It indicates that they may select cyber proxies within their territories to credibly threaten them for failures or mission creep, thus reducing risks. This work offers an overview of cyber capabilities within these four states and their use of cyber proxies, providing preliminary findings to suggest why they adopted cyber proxy strategies. During this period of global uncertainty, much of our everyday lives have been forced online. It is even more critical to protect our infrastructure from cyber threat actors and increase awareness of the source of intrusions within our networks. As data in this field improves, this thesis hopes to serve as a framework for future researchers to test, with more certainty, the causal links between these explanations and the use of cyber proxies within these four states.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Date created | May 29, 2020 |
Creators/Contributors
| Author | Feuer, Samantha |
|---|---|
| Degree granting institution | Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation |
| Primary advisor | Zegart, Amy |
| Primary advisor | Grotto, Andrew |
Subjects
| Subject | Center for International Security and Cooperation |
|---|---|
| Subject | transit |
| Subject | planning |
| Subject | international cooperation |
| Genre | Thesis |
Bibliographic information
Access conditions
- Use and reproduction
- User agrees that, where applicable, content will not be used to identify or to otherwise infringe the privacy or confidentiality rights of individuals. Content distributed via the Stanford Digital Repository may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
Preferred citation
- Preferred Citation
- Feuer, Samantha. (2020). From the Shadows to the Front Page: State Use of Proxies for Cyber Operations. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at: https://purl.stanford.edu/qg803cw8678
Collection
Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Interschool Honors Program in International Security Studies, Theses
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- Contact
- samanthavictoriafeuer@gmail.com
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