Kant and the structure of the given

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract
The aim of this dissertation is to provide an interpretation that can resolve the prima facie tension between Kant's simultaneous commitment to the duality of the faculties (the Duality Principle) and the claim that they must work together to produce cognition (the Togetherness Principle). This tension is at the center of the recent debate between conceptualist and nonconceptualist interpretations of the Critique of Pure Reason. I aim to resolve the tension by accommodating Kant's commitment to the non-conceptual nature of space and time (the Duality Principle) while explaining the fundamental role of the understanding not only in judgment but also in perception (the Togetherness Principle). Drawing on the contemporary distinction between the content of perception and the requirements for the possession of that content, I argue that the primary content of empirical and pure intuition is non-conceptual. Against most nonconceptualists, however, I argue that this content can only be "given" to subjects who possess certain conceptual capacities that, for Kant, are fundamentally linked to the conditions for the unity of apperception. There is an important sense in which conceptual capacities transform what is given in intuition, so that what Kant calls "perception" involves the introduction of a conceptual structure into the non-conceptual given.

Description

Type of resource text
Form electronic; electronic resource; remote
Extent 1 online resource.
Publication date 2017
Issuance monographic
Language English

Creators/Contributors

Associated with Williams, Jessica J
Associated with Stanford University, Department of Philosophy.
Primary advisor Anderson, R. Lanier
Thesis advisor Anderson, R. Lanier
Thesis advisor De Pierris, Graciela Teresa
Thesis advisor Friedman, Michael
Thesis advisor Wood, Allen W
Advisor De Pierris, Graciela Teresa
Advisor Friedman, Michael
Advisor Wood, Allen W

Subjects

Genre Theses

Bibliographic information

Statement of responsibility Jessica J. Williams.
Note Submitted to the Department of Philosophy.
Thesis Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2017.
Location electronic resource

Access conditions

Copyright
© 2017 by Jessica Jean Williams
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).

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