The will and normative judgment

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract
This dissertation focuses on the nature of intention and the scope of the kinds of objects it can take as contents. Contrary to the established opinion, I argue that human beings have the capacity to intend ends that go well beyond what they believe they can do or control. If we think of the will as the faculty by which we come to adopt and be committed to ends in practical deliberation, then what I argue for is a broader conception of the will. I think this broader conception provides us with new and fertile theoretical resources to account for dimensions of human agency that remain inaccessible to a theory of intention that restricts its possible objects to states of affairs the agent believes she can control. Here, I begin to explore the theoretical potential of this conception by showing how it can be employed by certain non-realist views in metanormativity to present attractive accounts of the nature of normative judgment. More specifically, I argue that Expressivist, Contextualist and Relativist metanormative views can appeal to the notion of an intention that takes as contents appropriately general principles of action—principles that concern what people in general are to do, or what everyone is to do in a given situation—to present a model of normative judgments that would help them deal, among other things, with one of the most pressing problems they currently face: that of accounting for interpersonal disagreement.

Description

Type of resource text
Form electronic; electronic resource; remote
Extent 1 online resource.
Publication date 2016
Issuance monographic
Language English

Creators/Contributors

Associated with Núñez Jiménez, Carlos
Associated with Stanford University, Department of Philosophy.
Primary advisor Bratman, Michael
Thesis advisor Bratman, Michael
Thesis advisor Dannenberg, Jorah, 1979-
Thesis advisor Hussain, Nadeem J. Z
Advisor Dannenberg, Jorah, 1979-
Advisor Hussain, Nadeem J. Z

Subjects

Genre Theses

Bibliographic information

Statement of responsibility Carlos Núñez Jiménez.
Note Submitted to the Department of Philosophy.
Thesis Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2016.
Location electronic resource

Access conditions

Copyright
© 2016 by Carlos Nunez Jimenez

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