A less thoroughly holistic neobehaviorism

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract: This dissertation begins to explore the philosophical significance of the thesis that some facts about an agent's mind are facts about the agent's abilities. This is done in two parts. First, certain philosophical accounts of knowledge as a kind of ability are discussed and amended with support from original exegetical work on what Ryle calls 'semi-hypothetical' descriptions. Second, an argument is made that certain psychological explanations (of an agent's conduct) underwritten by facts about the agent's knowledge (understood as an ability) are less holistic in a certain way, and consequently that a philosophical Neobehaviorism that incorporates such forms of explanation may be less thoroughly holistic than it otherwise might be

Type of resource	text
Form	electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource
Extent	1 online resource
Place	California
Place	[Stanford, California]
Publisher	[Stanford University]
Copyright date	2021; ©2021
Publication date	2021; 2021
Issuance	monographic
Language	English

Author	Turman, John (John Michael)
Degree supervisor	Hills, David
Thesis advisor	Hills, David
Thesis advisor	Icard, Thomas
Thesis advisor	Lawlor, Krista
Degree committee member	Icard, Thomas
Degree committee member	Lawlor, Krista
Associated with	Stanford University, Department of Philosophy

Genre	Theses
Genre	Text

Statement of responsibility	John Turman
Note	Submitted to the Department of Philosophy
Thesis	Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2021
Location	https://purl.stanford.edu/nx484qs6907

License: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).

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