Objective probability and the art of judgment

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract
This dissertation argues that for many purposes, it is often useful to regard probability as objective; and, furthermore, that we can do so without any metaphysically heavyweight commitments. Those claims will be defended within three broad domains: quantum mechanics, classical statistical mechanics, and macroscopic chance events such as coin tosses. It will be explored how taking objective probability as a function of two arguments (i.e., taking it as primitively conditional) contributes to its overall usefulness. Finally, it will be discussed how objective probability can guide our actual degrees of belief. A pluralist picture will be presented in which many variants of Lewis's Principal Principle are all of some use, each with their merits and demerits.

Description

Type of resource text
Form electronic; electronic resource; remote
Extent 1 online resource.
Publication date 2014
Issuance monographic
Language English

Creators/Contributors

Associated with Nelson, Kevin
Associated with Stanford University, Department of Philosophy.
Primary advisor Ryckman, Thomas
Thesis advisor Ryckman, Thomas
Thesis advisor Friedman, Michael, 1947-
Thesis advisor Lawlor, Krista
Thesis advisor Skyrms, Brian
Advisor Friedman, Michael, 1947-
Advisor Lawlor, Krista
Advisor Skyrms, Brian

Subjects

Genre Theses

Bibliographic information

Statement of responsibility Kevin Nelson.
Note Submitted to the Department of Philosophy.
Thesis Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2014.
Location electronic resource

Access conditions

Copyright
© 2014 by Kevin Nelson
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial No Derivatives 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC-ND).

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