Objective probability and the art of judgment
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- This dissertation argues that for many purposes, it is often useful to regard probability as objective; and, furthermore, that we can do so without any metaphysically heavyweight commitments. Those claims will be defended within three broad domains: quantum mechanics, classical statistical mechanics, and macroscopic chance events such as coin tosses. It will be explored how taking objective probability as a function of two arguments (i.e., taking it as primitively conditional) contributes to its overall usefulness. Finally, it will be discussed how objective probability can guide our actual degrees of belief. A pluralist picture will be presented in which many variants of Lewis's Principal Principle are all of some use, each with their merits and demerits.
Description
Type of resource | text |
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Form | electronic; electronic resource; remote |
Extent | 1 online resource. |
Publication date | 2014 |
Issuance | monographic |
Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
Associated with | Nelson, Kevin |
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Associated with | Stanford University, Department of Philosophy. |
Primary advisor | Ryckman, Thomas |
Thesis advisor | Ryckman, Thomas |
Thesis advisor | Friedman, Michael, 1947- |
Thesis advisor | Lawlor, Krista |
Thesis advisor | Skyrms, Brian |
Advisor | Friedman, Michael, 1947- |
Advisor | Lawlor, Krista |
Advisor | Skyrms, Brian |
Subjects
Genre | Theses |
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Bibliographic information
Statement of responsibility | Kevin Nelson. |
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Note | Submitted to the Department of Philosophy. |
Thesis | Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2014. |
Location | electronic resource |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2014 by Kevin Nelson
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial No Derivatives 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC-ND).
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