Pushing Peace: The Relationship Between the Taliban’s Strength and Its Openness to Negotiations
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- Since 2009, the United States has worked to push the Taliban into negotiating a peaceful end to the conflict in Afghanistan. However, U.S. policymakers have consistently struggled to strike an appropriate balance between degrading the Taliban’s operational capabilities through the use of military force, and encouraging its diplomatic cooperation by exercising restraint. The question of whether an insurgent group is more open to negotiations when it is weak or when it is strong is central to literature on conflict resolution and counterinsurgency warfare. Similarly, U.S. strategy in Afghanistan begs the question—does the Taliban make a better partner for peace when it is weak or when it is strong? In order to answer this question, I chose to measure the Taliban’s strength over time, charting it against changes in its attitude toward negotiations. In order to do this, I analyzed three variables that are closely related to an insurgent group’s ability to operate effectively: extent of territorial control, continuity and cohesion of leadership, and access to public support. The results from my two case studies on the Taliban (Pre-2013 and Post-2013) suggest that the Taliban was more willing to negotiate when its territorial holds and perceived public support were weak, and when its central leadership was strong. These findings are significant, because they challenge the idea that weakening the Taliban on all fronts is most conducive to encouraging peace talks. Rather, they suggest that the United States will be most successful in bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table if it limits the Taliban’s territorial control and public support, while preserving the continuity and cohesion of its top leaders and diplomatic decision-makers.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Date created | May 19, 2018 |
Creators/Contributors
| Author | Pritchard, Kaileen Marie |
|---|---|
| Primary advisor | Schultz, Kenneth A. |
Subjects
| Subject | Center for International Security and Cooperation |
|---|---|
| Subject | Stanford University |
| Subject | Taliban |
| Subject | Afghanistan |
| Subject | negotiation |
| Subject | insurgency |
| Subject | counterinsurgency |
| Subject | territory |
| Subject | leadership |
| Subject | public support |
| Genre | Thesis |
Bibliographic information
| Related item | |
|---|---|
| Location | https://purl.stanford.edu/np166rn3069 |
Access conditions
- Use and reproduction
- User agrees that, where applicable, content will not be used to identify or to otherwise infringe the privacy or confidentiality rights of individuals. Content distributed via the Stanford Digital Repository may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
Preferred citation
- Preferred Citation
- Pritchard, Kaileen Marie. (2018). Pushing Peace: The Relationship Between the Taliban’s Strength and Its Openness to Negotiations. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at: https://purl.stanford.edu/np166rn3069
Collection
Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Interschool Honors Program in International Security Studies, Theses
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- Contact
- kamarie3@alumni.stanford.edu
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