The Effectiveness of the Wassenaar Arrangement as the Non-Proliferation Regime for Conventional Weapons

Sovereign countries assume they have the right to purchase weapons to strengthen their national security; however, unrestricted arms trade destabilizes regions, contributes to human rights violations, and drives interstate conflicts. Over the past century, major weapon exporting states have recognized arms trade regulation as critical for international security and, in 1996, formed the Wassenaar Arrangement as an export control group for conventional weapons. However, critics of the regime claim that the principles designed to make it successful, namely its emphasis on cooperation and transparency, lead to ineffectiveness at regulating weapons transfers.
This thesis examines the Wassenaar Arrangement and asks to what extent it has achieved its stated purpose of preventing “destabilizing accumulations” of conventional weapons. Findings show that regional trends of weapon imports and economic activity between 1980-2013 reveal no clear evidence of a shift in arms trade as a result of the regime’s formation: weapons import data for select countries from 2003-2013 indicate that members of the Wassenaar Arrangement have not limited or altered their sales in any noticeable way. This study concludes that economic incentives may undermine cooperation within the arrangement.