Essays in information economics
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- This dissertation comprises three essays in information economics. Each essay employs tools from mechanism design and game theory to examine individuals' incentives when acquiring information and when sharing that information with others. The first chapter considers a mechanism design setting in which agents can obtain costly information about their own preferences and those of others. A mechanism is informationally simple if agents have no incentive to learn about others' preferences. This property is of interest for two reasons: First, it is a necessary condition for the existence of dominant strategy equilibria in the extended game. Second, it endogenizes an "independent private value" property of the interim information structure. We show that, generically, a mechanism is informationally simple if and only if it satisfies a separability condition which rules out most economically meaningful mechanisms. The second chapter examines auctions in which buyers can acquire costly information about their own valuations and those of others, and investigates how competition among buyers shapes their learning incentives. In equilibrium, buyers find it cost-efficient to acquire some information about their competitors so as to only learn their valuations when they have a fair chance of winning. We show that such learning incentives make competition between buyers less effective: losing buyers often fail to learn their valuations precisely and, as a result, compete less aggressively for the good. The third chapter deviates from the preceding two by focusing on how individuals communicate with each other. It seeks to understand how individuals' subjective models of the world, or worldviews, affect communication.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Form | electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource |
| Extent | 1 online resource. |
| Place | California |
| Place | [Stanford, California] |
| Publisher | [Stanford University] |
| Copyright date | 2023; ©2023 |
| Publication date | 2023; 2023 |
| Issuance | monographic |
| Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
| Author | Pernoud, Agathe Alysse |
|---|---|
| Degree supervisor | Jackson, Matthew O |
| Thesis advisor | Jackson, Matthew O |
| Thesis advisor | Akbarpour, Mohammad |
| Thesis advisor | Milgrom, Paul R. (paul Robert), 1948- |
| Degree committee member | Akbarpour, Mohammad |
| Degree committee member | Milgrom, Paul R. (paul Robert), 1948- |
| Associated with | Stanford University, School of Humanities and Sciences |
| Associated with | Stanford University, Department of Economics |
Subjects
| Genre | Theses |
|---|---|
| Genre | Text |
Bibliographic information
| Statement of responsibility | Agathe Pernoud. |
|---|---|
| Note | Submitted to the Department of Economics. |
| Thesis | Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2023. |
| Location | https://purl.stanford.edu/mg245tc9241 |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2023 by Agathe Alysse Pernoud
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