Reciprocity and legislative organization
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- I explore the implications of a novel assumption about legislators' preferences: that they, like most human beings, have a preference for reciprocity. That is, they like to help those who have helped them in the past and harm those who have harmed them in the past for its own sake. The first chapter highlights that the preference for reciprocity implies congressional parties face a tradeoff between giving their leaders the resources necessary to produce collective goods and ensuring that ineffective leaders can be removed from office. The second chapter shows that the legislature faces a tradeoff between ensuring allocative efficiency by using discretionary authority and minimizing costly interpersonal conflict through deference to rules. The third chapter provides empirical evidence for the preference for reciprocity by studying how legislators behave immediately before they exit the chamber.
Description
Type of resource | text |
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Form | electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource |
Extent | 1 online resource. |
Place | California |
Place | [Stanford, California] |
Publisher | [Stanford University] |
Copyright date | 2019; ©2019 |
Publication date | 2019; 2019 |
Issuance | monographic |
Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
Author | Fong, Christian James |
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Degree supervisor | Krehbiel, Keith, 1955- |
Thesis advisor | Krehbiel, Keith, 1955- |
Thesis advisor | Broockman, David E |
Thesis advisor | Moe, Terry M |
Degree committee member | Broockman, David E |
Degree committee member | Moe, Terry M |
Associated with | Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. |
Subjects
Genre | Theses |
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Genre | Text |
Bibliographic information
Statement of responsibility | Christian Fong. |
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Note | Submitted to the Graduate School of Business. |
Thesis | Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2019. |
Location | electronic resource |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2019 by Christian James Fong
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
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