"The Looming Nuclear War"

<a href="https://embed.stanford.edu/iframe/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fpurl.stanford.edu%2Fks918pb4169" class="su-underline">Show Content</a>

Abstract/Contents

Abstract: Despite the fact that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons in contemporary international security and defense policy relates to deterrence there is a looming nuclear war simply because it is always possible that these weapons would be used at some point. This analysis goes beneath geopolitics to look at nuclear weapons as the formidable and indeterminate tools they are but also offers criticism of the USA and Russia for leaving the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty (INF) in 2009, a treaty that Reagan and Gorbachev had signed in 1987.

Author	Dupuy, Jean-Pierre

DOI	https://doi.org/10.25740/ks918pb4169
Location	https://purl.stanford.edu/ks918pb4169

Use and reproduction: User agrees that, where applicable, content will not be used to identify or to otherwise infringe the privacy or confidentiality rights of individuals. Content distributed via the Stanford Digital Repository may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.
License: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial No Derivatives 4.0 International license (CC BY-NC-ND).

Preferred citation: Dupuy, J. (2023). "The Looming Nuclear War"in Intersections, Reinforcements, Cascades: Proceedings of the 2023 Stanford Existential Risks Conference. The Stanford Existential Risks Initiative. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at https://purl.stanford.edu/ks918pb4169. https://doi.org/10.25740/ks918pb4169.

Intersections, Reinforcements, Cascades: The Proceedings of the 3rd Annual Stanford Existential Risks Conference

Loading usage metrics...