Essays on core-selecting auctions
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- This dissertation provides a theoretical performance comparison of some of the leading sealed-bid combinatorial auctions and consists of three main chapters. The first chapter characterizes the complete set of pure-strategy, full-information, Nash equilibria of a set of combinatorial auctions that includes the Vickrey package auction and all core-selecting auctions. All bidder-optimal core-selecting (BOCS) auctions and the Vickrey auction have the same set of equilibrium outcomes: any assignment and individually rational payments. The equilibrium outcomes of the PAB auction must satisfy a stronger condition, but still include many inefficient assignments and payoffs outside of the true core. The second chapter looks at incentives for overbidding -- bidding more than true values -- in minimum-revenue core-selecting auctions. Previous studies ruled out overbidding by including arbitrary simplifying restrictions on the allowable bids. This chapter overturns those previous results, showing that overbidding can be a feature of all Bayesian equilibria in undominated strategies in certain incomplete-information settings. This overbidding can lead to higher expected efficiency and higher expected revenues than those with a restricted strategy space. The third chapter challenges some of the supposed advantages of BOCS auctions over the Vickrey auction with a new model of unrelated goods -- those which are neither substitutes nor complements for any bidder. The unrelated goods highlight the similarities between these auction formats, both of which can suffer from issues of low revenue and revenue non-monotonicity.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Form | electronic; electronic resource; remote |
| Extent | 1 online resource. |
| Publication date | 2013 |
| Issuance | monographic |
| Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
| Associated with | Beck, Marissa Renee |
|---|---|
| Associated with | Stanford University, Department of Economics. |
| Primary advisor | Milgrom, Paul R. (Paul Robert), 1948- |
| Thesis advisor | Milgrom, Paul R. (Paul Robert), 1948- |
| Thesis advisor | Kojima, Fuhito |
| Thesis advisor | Segal, Ilya |
| Advisor | Kojima, Fuhito |
| Advisor | Segal, Ilya |
Subjects
| Genre | Theses |
|---|
Bibliographic information
| Statement of responsibility | Marissa Renee Beck. |
|---|---|
| Note | Submitted to the Department of Economics. |
| Thesis | Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2013. |
| Location | electronic resource |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2013 by Marissa Renee Beck
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
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