Cryptography in the age of quantum computers
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- It is well established that full-fledged quantum computers, when realized, will completely break many of today's cryptosystems. This looming threat has led to the proposal of so-called "post-quantum" systems, namely those that appear resistant to quantum attacks. We argue, however, that the attacks considered in prior works model only the near future, where the attacker may be equipped with a quantum computer, but the end-users implementing the protocols are still running classical devices. Eventually, quantum computers will reach maturity and everyone - even the end-users - will be running quantum computers. In this event, attackers can interact with the end-users over quantum channels, opening up a new set of attacks that have not been considered before. This thesis puts forth new security models and new security analyses showing how to ensure security against such quantum channel attacks. In particular, we re-build many core cryptographic functionalities, including pseudorandom functions, encryption, digital signatures, and more, resulting in the first protocols that are safe to use in a ubiquitous quantum computing world. Along the way, we resolve several open problems in quantum query complexity, such as the Collision Problem for random functions, the Set Equality Problem, and the Oracle Interrogation Problem.
Description
Type of resource | text |
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Form | electronic; electronic resource; remote |
Extent | 1 online resource. |
Publication date | 2015 |
Issuance | monographic |
Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
Associated with | Zhandry, Mark |
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Associated with | Stanford University, Department of Computer Science. |
Primary advisor | Boneh, Dan |
Thesis advisor | Boneh, Dan |
Thesis advisor | Valiant, Gregory |
Thesis advisor | Williams, Ryan (Richard Ryan) |
Advisor | Valiant, Gregory |
Advisor | Williams, Ryan (Richard Ryan) |
Subjects
Genre | Theses |
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Bibliographic information
Statement of responsibility | Mark Zhandry. |
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Note | Submitted to the Department of Computer Science. |
Thesis | Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2015. |
Location | electronic resource |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2015 by Mark Landry Zhandry
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
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