Counterinsurgency Principles and US Military Effectiveness in Iraq

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract: Since the end of major combat operations in Iraq in May 2003, the US military has been struggling to restore security and stability to the country in the face of irregular armed opposition. In response, the military has gradually adopted principles of counterinsurgency first enunciated during the Cold War as the core of its strategy in Iraq and its preparations for similar conflicts in the future. This commitment to “classic” counterinsurgency is clearly manifested in the recently published US Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual. However, this thesis shows that counterinsurgency as presently conceived and implemented has not produced positive strategic improvements in security in Iraq. Part of the problem is the uneven application of counterinsurgency principles due to the military’s lack of capabilities appropriate for tasks other than high-intensity combat. However, a more significant but less-studied reason for the military’s inability to secure Iraq is that the counterinsurgency principles that it operates by do not properly address the situation in that country, which is faced with a failing government, civil war, and general lawlessness as well as an insurgency. This thesis recommends addressing the limitations of counterinsurgency doctrine with a more comprehensive national strategy for nation building that would be a better framework for addressing future conflicts similar to Iraq.

Type of resource	text
Date created	May 2007

Author	Burton, Brian
Advisor	Holloway, David

Subject	CISAC
Subject	Center for International Security and Cooperation
Subject	Stanford University
Subject	United States
Subject	Iraq
Subject	counterinsurgency
Subject	military policy
Genre	Thesis

Location	https://purl.stanford.edu/kg759gt1104

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License: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).

Preferred Citation: Burton, Brian. (2007). Counterinsurgency Principles and US Military Effectiveness in Iraq. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at: http://purl.stanford.edu/kg759gt1104

Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Interschool Honors Program in International Security Studies, Theses

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