Screening for Breakthroughs
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- We identify a new dynamic agency problem: that of incentivising the prompt disclosure of productive information. To study it, we introduce a general model in which a technological breakthrough occurs at an uncertain time and is privately observed by an agent, and a principal must incentivise disclosure via her control of the agent’s utility. We uncover a deadline structure of optimal mechanisms: they have a simple deadline form in an important special case, and a graduated deadline structure in general. We apply our results to the design of unemployment insurance schemes.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Date created | August 20, 2021 |
Creators/Contributors
| Author | Curello, Gregorio |
|---|---|
| Author | Sinander, Ludvig |
| Organizer of meeting | Board, Simon |
| Organizer of meeting | Cisternas, Gonzalo |
| Organizer of meeting | Frick, Mira |
| Organizer of meeting | Georgiadis, George |
| Organizer of meeting | Skrzypacz, Andrzej |
| Organizer of meeting | Sugaya, Takuo |
Subjects
| Subject | economics |
|---|---|
| Genre | Text |
| Genre | Working paper |
| Genre | Grey literature |
Bibliographic information
Access conditions
- Use and reproduction
- User agrees that, where applicable, content will not be used to identify or to otherwise infringe the privacy or confidentiality rights of individuals. Content distributed via the Stanford Digital Repository may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY).
Preferred citation
- Preferred citation
- Curello, G. and Sinander, L. (2022). Screening for Breakthroughs. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at https://purl.stanford.edu/kf830nx7810
Collection
SITE Conference 2021
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- siteworkshop@stanford.edu
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