Corruption and social norms : explaining corruption's persistence in the face of moral condemnation
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- This dissertation uses social norms theory to explain why individuals in badly governed societies often tolerate and perpetuate corrupt practices despite simultaneously regarding such behaviors as morally dubious. It is composed of three stand-alone, but related, empirical papers. The first paper argues that the choice between corruption and honesty is a matter of conditional compliance: individuals will abide by norms of integrity when they trust their compatriots to do so as well. I examine the mechanisms underlying stability and change in normative beliefs, focusing specifically on the role of inter-group interactions and social stigma. The second paper takes up the question of corruption tolerance: given that reporting corruption is often socially beneficial but individually costly for citizens, under what conditions will whistleblowers emerge? I show that individuals' motivations to engage in costly monitoring are shaped by the formal institutional environment. In particular, effective enforcement institutions that take citizens' reports seriously can bring about greater grassroots engagement by signaling that reporting is a valuable personal sacrifice, rather than the meaningless protest of a "sucker." In the third paper, I reexamine the literature on the moral virtues of corruption. In particular, scholars have argued that individuals often engage in malfeasance out of feelings of obligation towards their family members, friends, and other "insiders." Further, some cultures are said to emphasize particularistic norms more so than others, which helps to explain why these societies also experience higher levels of corruption. I find evidence that although particularism does tend to erode the salience of honesty norms at the individual level, the strength of in-group ties does not seem to vary across the two cultural groups (Northern and Southern Italians) I examine. Overall, the dissertation demonstrates that social norms play an important role in sustaining corrupt practices by helping to define the social appropriateness of illicit behavior. I conclude with a discussion of policy implications, focusing in particular on the role of anti-corruption policies in norms management.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Form | electronic; electronic resource; remote |
| Extent | 1 online resource. |
| Publication date | 2014 |
| Issuance | monographic |
| Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
| Associated with | Zhang, Nan |
|---|---|
| Associated with | Stanford University, Department of Political Science. |
| Primary advisor | Laitin, David D |
| Thesis advisor | Laitin, David D |
| Thesis advisor | Goldstein, Judith |
| Thesis advisor | Krasner, Stephen D, 1942- |
| Advisor | Goldstein, Judith |
| Advisor | Krasner, Stephen D, 1942- |
Subjects
| Genre | Theses |
|---|
Bibliographic information
| Statement of responsibility | Nan Zhang. |
|---|---|
| Note | Submitted to the Department of Political Science. |
| Thesis | Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2014. |
| Location | electronic resource |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2014 by Nan Zhang
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
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