Nonproliferation Sanctions: Taking the "Profit out of Proliferation?"

How do sanctions impact national decisions to go nuclear? Sanctions have emerged as a frequently employed tool of statecraft and as a go-to tool in U.S. nonproliferation policy. However, the outcomes of proliferation and nonproliferation in cases of sanction imposition beg a closer examination of their efficacy- when and how are sanctions effective?
This thesis finds that the efficacy of nonproliferation sanctions depends on their ability to impact domestic politics and change the calculus in the nuclear decision-making process. The causal mechanisms behind national decisions to go nuclear reveal that the efficacy of sanctions depends on domestic political conditions. These conditions include regime type, the structure of the economy, and domestic political coalitions.
In order to understand the causal mechanisms of sanctions, this thesis examines the empirical evidence of nonproliferation sanctions imposition. The cases are divided into two categories: North Korea, Pakistan, and India constitute the proliferation outcome cases, and South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, and Libya constitute the nonproliferation outcome cases. By analyzing the causal mechanisms of sanctions and applying the relevant theoretical frameworks of sanction efficacy in these cases, this thesis gleans insights on the conditions that render sanctions effective in dissuading states from proliferation. Ultimately, this thesis seeks to understand how sanctions can be effectively maximized as a tool of nonproliferation policy and to contribute to the literature on nonproliferation sanctions.