The Problem of Warning: Homeland Security and the Evolution of Terrorism Advisory Systems

In the decade after 9/11, the U.S. government attempted to construct two national warning systems for terrorism. The first, the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS), suffered from lack of credibility. The second, the National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS), has been silent since its inception. Neither system has proved effective in providing protection and reassurance to the American public. What explanation accounts for the evolution of the HSAS and its replacement, the NTAS? Why did Washington create an institution that didn’t work, and why did it replace it with an equally broken system?

This thesis uses three potential explanations to examine this evolutionary story: (1) policy streams and the policymaking process, (2) individual interests and leadership, and (3) organizational politics. A contingent explanation is ultimately necessary: based on the stage in the life cycle of the evolution of these warning systems, different factors prove to be most influential in shaping development outcomes. At the birth of the HSAS, policy streams proved most important: policymakers searched for a ready-made solution to deal with a brewing crisis. Later on, however, individual interests and bureaucratic politics played more prominent roles. The HSAS would never have been replaced had it not been for the leadership of certain individuals at DHS, and the growing bureaucratic interests surrounding the warning system.