Supply chain contracts for perishable goods with a fixed shelf life
- Managing a supply chain for a perishable good with extremely short shelf life and high value is a challenging task. In such a supply chain, the availability and the utilization of this perishable good become important performance measures. Especially when the supply chain is decentralized, these performance measures may generate conflicting incentives between supply chain partners, where utilization is critical for a supplier and availability for buyers. In this dissertation, we address channel coordination problems for various forms of decentralized supply chains that deal with perishable goods with a fixed shelf life to investigate how to reconcile such misaligned incentives between the supplier and the buyer(s). A platelet supply chain between blood centers and hospitals is a typical example of such a supply chain, where utilization is critical for blood centers and availability for hospitals. Due to such misaligned incentives, blood centers prefer to push older units to hospitals for better utilization of platelets, while hospitals prefer to receive younger units to achieve higher availability. Although there may be various approaches to address the issue of decentralized supply chains, this dissertation particularly focuses on the supply chain contracts.
|Type of resource
|electronic; electronic resource; remote
|1 online resource.
|Stanford University, Department of Management Science and Engineering
|Hausman, Warren H
|Hausman, Warren H
|Statement of responsibility
|Submitted to the Department of Management Science and Engineering.
|Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2011.
- © 2011 by Yenho Chung
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
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