Learning and incentives in waitlist mechanisms
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- This dissertation is motivated by the deceased donor kidney allocation system in the United States. Through stylized models, I develop theories to examine the interplay of learning and incentives in such allocation markets. In Chapter 1, I consider a mechanism design problem where a social planner needs to decide whether and how to allocate a single object to a queue of strategic and privately informed agents. Using tools from operations research and voting literatures, I propose a simple mechanism that can effectively crowdsource agents' private information by balancing their strategic incentives and planner's learning goal. In Chapter 2, I add inter-temporal dynamics to study the equilibrium and optimal strategy in the presence of both dynamic incentives and observational learning in first-come-first-served waitlists. On the one hand, the availability of object implies preceding agents' remaining on the waitlist, which incentivizes agents to accept. On the other hand, it may also imply negative object quality via observational learning, incentivizing agents to reject. I show how these opposing forces come into play. Finally, in Chapter 3 I develop machine learning models to predict hard-to-place kidneys based on donor characteristics and signals from waitlist candidates.
Description
Type of resource | text |
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Form | electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource |
Extent | 1 online resource. |
Place | California |
Place | [Stanford, California] |
Publisher | [Stanford University] |
Copyright date | 2022; ©2022 |
Publication date | 2022; 2022 |
Issuance | monographic |
Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
Author | Kang, Jamie Juhee |
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Degree supervisor | Ashlagi, Itai |
Thesis advisor | Ashlagi, Itai |
Thesis advisor | Lo, Irene, (Management science professor) |
Thesis advisor | Saban, Daniela |
Degree committee member | Lo, Irene, (Management science professor) |
Degree committee member | Saban, Daniela |
Associated with | Stanford University, Department of Management Science and Engineering |
Subjects
Genre | Theses |
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Genre | Text |
Bibliographic information
Statement of responsibility | Jamie Juhee Kang. |
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Note | Submitted to the Department of Management Science and Engineering. |
Thesis | Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2022. |
Location | https://purl.stanford.edu/ht172vh2387 |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2022 by Jamie Juhee Kang
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
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