Learning and incentives in waitlist mechanisms

Placeholder Show Content

Abstract/Contents

Abstract
This dissertation is motivated by the deceased donor kidney allocation system in the United States. Through stylized models, I develop theories to examine the interplay of learning and incentives in such allocation markets. In Chapter 1, I consider a mechanism design problem where a social planner needs to decide whether and how to allocate a single object to a queue of strategic and privately informed agents. Using tools from operations research and voting literatures, I propose a simple mechanism that can effectively crowdsource agents' private information by balancing their strategic incentives and planner's learning goal. In Chapter 2, I add inter-temporal dynamics to study the equilibrium and optimal strategy in the presence of both dynamic incentives and observational learning in first-come-first-served waitlists. On the one hand, the availability of object implies preceding agents' remaining on the waitlist, which incentivizes agents to accept. On the other hand, it may also imply negative object quality via observational learning, incentivizing agents to reject. I show how these opposing forces come into play. Finally, in Chapter 3 I develop machine learning models to predict hard-to-place kidneys based on donor characteristics and signals from waitlist candidates.

Description

Type of resource text
Form electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource
Extent 1 online resource.
Place California
Place [Stanford, California]
Publisher [Stanford University]
Copyright date 2022; ©2022
Publication date 2022; 2022
Issuance monographic
Language English

Creators/Contributors

Author Kang, Jamie Juhee
Degree supervisor Ashlagi, Itai
Thesis advisor Ashlagi, Itai
Thesis advisor Lo, Irene, (Management science professor)
Thesis advisor Saban, Daniela
Degree committee member Lo, Irene, (Management science professor)
Degree committee member Saban, Daniela
Associated with Stanford University, Department of Management Science and Engineering

Subjects

Genre Theses
Genre Text

Bibliographic information

Statement of responsibility Jamie Juhee Kang.
Note Submitted to the Department of Management Science and Engineering.
Thesis Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2022.
Location https://purl.stanford.edu/ht172vh2387

Access conditions

Copyright
© 2022 by Jamie Juhee Kang
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).

Also listed in

Loading usage metrics...