Mathematical and physical space in Kantian idealism
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- Kant's transcendental idealism aims to explain how we have mathematical knowledge. It frames space and time as pure 'forms' of our ability to acquire sensations, rather than as independently existing entities or their properties. This is then also supposed to explain how we can anticipate formal features of experience. The space we study in geometry is the very one in which objects appear to us. In the last several decades, however, scholarship has implicitly recognized Kant's notion of space is not as unified as this picture would suggest. In particular, the straightforward assumption that there is just one space - both mathematical and physical - has implicitly come under scrutiny. I locate grounds for this scrutiny within Kant's direct and indirect proofs for transcendental idealism. However, I argue the disunity of space actually strengthens Kant's doctrine. I clarify how Kant intends to incorporate Newtonian matter theory while responding to Leibnizian rationalism. To do this, I specify the evidential hurdles Newton faced in determining whether gravity is a well-founded physical magnitude. I suggest Kant's evolving criticisms of physical monadology gradually include more of Newton's matter theory. The inclusions reflect Kant's growing clarity on his precise disagreements with Leibniz. The core of these, I argue, is the distinction between matter and form as it applies to thought.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Form | electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource |
| Extent | 1 online resource. |
| Place | California |
| Place | [Stanford, California] |
| Publisher | [Stanford University] |
| Copyright date | 2019; ©2019 |
| Publication date | 2019; 2019 |
| Issuance | monographic |
| Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
| Author | Parker, Adwait A |
|---|---|
| Degree supervisor | Friedman, Michael, 1947- |
| Thesis advisor | Friedman, Michael, 1947- |
| Thesis advisor | Anderson, R. Lanier |
| Thesis advisor | Ryckman, Thomas |
| Thesis advisor | Smith, George E. (George Edwin), 1938- |
| Degree committee member | Anderson, R. Lanier |
| Degree committee member | Ryckman, Thomas |
| Degree committee member | Smith, George E. (George Edwin), 1938- |
| Associated with | Stanford University, Department of Philosophy. |
Subjects
| Genre | Theses |
|---|---|
| Genre | Text |
Bibliographic information
| Statement of responsibility | Adwait A. Parker. |
|---|---|
| Note | Submitted to the Department of Philosophy. |
| Thesis | Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2019. |
| Location | electronic resource |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2019 by Adwait A. Parker
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
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