Matching In Groups: A Theoretical and Empirical Study

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract: We study the matching of workers to firms when workers have preferences over being matched with their colleagues. We extend existing results by considering that workers want to be matched in groups of friends, and these groups of friends partition the set of workers. Rather than agents having preferences over their own side of the market, they have a pre-determined set of agents with whom they want to be matched, and we want to keep these groups intact to whatever extent we can. We then propose several algorithms to match agents in groups, and we analyze the stability and other desirable properties of the matchings. We develop an algorithm to find a stable matching in the case of all workers in a group having the same preferences, all groups being the same size, and all firms having the same capacity. However, if any of these three conditions fail to hold, then there may not exist a stable matching for workers who want to be matched in groups. We include numerical results in the case of matchings that are almost stable. We examine an actual market to which we can apply our model and demonstrate how one of our algorithms does a better job of matching agents in groups.

Type of resource	text
Date created	May 2013

Author	Hogan, Virginia
Primary advisor	Kojima, Fuhito
Degree granting institution	Stanford Department of Economics

Subject	Stanford Department of Economics
Subject	market design
Subject	sororities
Subject	microeconomics
Subject	deferred acceptance
Subject	two-sided matching
Subject	coalition formation.
Genre	Thesis

Location	https://purl.stanford.edu/hh154jt4803

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Preferred Citation: Hogan, Virginia. (2013). Matching In Groups: A Theoretical and Empirical Study. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at: https://purl.stanford.edu/hh154jt4803

Stanford University, Department of Economics, Honors Theses

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