Multiple unemployment equilibria under non-representative agent demand

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract
This dissertation analyzes the possibility that high unemployment can be be self-reinforcing through its effects on the distribution of income and, consequently, aggregate demand. The major results of my work demonstrate that these forces can lead to multiple macroeconomic equilibria which are indexed by the level of unemployment. By characterizing low output and employment states as equilibrium outcomes, this thesis provides a coherent theoretical explanation for periods of persistently high unemployment. The key property throughout is non-homotheticity of consumers' preferences, whereby the market demand for goods changes as income distribution changes, even if the total income of all consumers remains fixed. This implies that, unlike in many macroeconomic models, demand cannot be generated from a representative agent and, crucially, that changes in employment along the extensive, as opposed to intensive, margin can have more severe general equilibrium consequences.

Description

Type of resource text
Form electronic; electronic resource; remote
Extent 1 online resource.
Publication date 2011
Issuance monographic
Language English

Creators/Contributors

Associated with Chiang, Arthur J
Associated with Stanford University, School of Business Administration.
Primary advisor Amador, Manuel (Manuel A.)
Primary advisor Jones, Charles
Thesis advisor Amador, Manuel (Manuel A.)
Thesis advisor Jones, Charles
Thesis advisor Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 1973-
Advisor Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 1973-

Subjects

Genre Theses

Bibliographic information

Statement of responsibility Arthur J. Chiang.
Note Submitted to the School of Business.
Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2011
Location electronic resource

Access conditions

Copyright
© 2011 by Arthur J. Chiang
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).

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