Private Renegotiations and Government Interventions in Debt Chains

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract
We propose a model of strategic debt renegotiation in which businesses are sequentially interconnected through their liabilities. This financing structure, which we refer to as a debt chain, gives rise to externalities, as a lender’s willingness to provide concessions to its privately informed borrower depends on how the lender’s own liabilities are expected to be renegotiated. Our analysis reveals how government interventions that aim to prevent default waves should account for these private renegotiation incentives and their interlinkages. Our results shed light on the effectiveness of subsidies and debt reduction programs following economic shocks such as pandemics or financial crises.

Description

Type of resource text
Date created September 1, 2021

Creators/Contributors

Author Glode, Vincent
Author Opp, Christian C.
Organizer of meeting Begenau, Juliane
Organizer of meeting Hansen, Lars Peter
Organizer of meeting Hebert, Ben
Organizer of meeting Piazzesi, Monika

Subjects

Subject debt renegotiation
Subject credit
Subject bargaining power
Subject default waves
Genre Text
Genre Working paper
Genre Grey literature

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY).

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Preferred citation
Glode, V. and Opp, C. (2022). Private Renegotiations and Government Interventions in Debt Chains. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at https://purl.stanford.edu/hb964yj8109

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