Essays on inattention and inequality
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- This dissertation consists of four papers in economic theory which study the optimal acquisition, transmission, and elicitation of information. The first two chapters consider models of rational inattention, in which agents flexibly and optimally acquire costly information before taking decisions under uncertainty. Chapter 1 provides (sequential) optimization foundations for the information cost functions used in the rational inattention literature. Chapter 2 studies a problem of Bayesian persuasion in which the receiver is rationally inattentive to the sender's messages. Chapters 3 and 4 consider models of dynamic mechanism design with persistent private information, with a particular focus on the long-run inequality generated by optimal mechanisms in canonical insurance environments.
Description
Type of resource | text |
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Form | electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource |
Extent | 1 online resource. |
Place | California |
Place | [Stanford, California] |
Publisher | [Stanford University] |
Copyright date | 2021; ©2021 |
Publication date | 2021; 2021 |
Issuance | monographic |
Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
Author | Bloedel, Alexander Wyatt |
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Degree supervisor | Milgrom, Paul R. (Paul Robert), 1948- |
Degree supervisor | Segal, Ilya |
Thesis advisor | Milgrom, Paul R. (Paul Robert), 1948- |
Thesis advisor | Segal, Ilya |
Thesis advisor | Bernheim, B. Douglas |
Degree committee member | Bernheim, B. Douglas |
Associated with | Stanford University, Department of Economics |
Subjects
Genre | Theses |
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Genre | Text |
Bibliographic information
Statement of responsibility | Alexander W. Bloedel. |
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Note | Submitted to the Department of Economics. |
Thesis | Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2021. |
Location | https://purl.stanford.edu/hb050cx8986 |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2021 by Alexander Wyatt Bloedel
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license (CC BY).
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