Essays on inattention and inequality

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract
This dissertation consists of four papers in economic theory which study the optimal acquisition, transmission, and elicitation of information. The first two chapters consider models of rational inattention, in which agents flexibly and optimally acquire costly information before taking decisions under uncertainty. Chapter 1 provides (sequential) optimization foundations for the information cost functions used in the rational inattention literature. Chapter 2 studies a problem of Bayesian persuasion in which the receiver is rationally inattentive to the sender's messages. Chapters 3 and 4 consider models of dynamic mechanism design with persistent private information, with a particular focus on the long-run inequality generated by optimal mechanisms in canonical insurance environments.

Description

Type of resource text
Form electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource
Extent 1 online resource.
Place California
Place [Stanford, California]
Publisher [Stanford University]
Copyright date 2021; ©2021
Publication date 2021; 2021
Issuance monographic
Language English

Creators/Contributors

Author Bloedel, Alexander Wyatt
Degree supervisor Milgrom, Paul R. (Paul Robert), 1948-
Degree supervisor Segal, Ilya
Thesis advisor Milgrom, Paul R. (Paul Robert), 1948-
Thesis advisor Segal, Ilya
Thesis advisor Bernheim, B. Douglas
Degree committee member Bernheim, B. Douglas
Associated with Stanford University, Department of Economics

Subjects

Genre Theses
Genre Text

Bibliographic information

Statement of responsibility Alexander W. Bloedel.
Note Submitted to the Department of Economics.
Thesis Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2021.
Location https://purl.stanford.edu/hb050cx8986

Access conditions

Copyright
© 2021 by Alexander Wyatt Bloedel
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license (CC BY).

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