Financial reporting quality and voluntary disclosure

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract
This thesis is comprised of two essays that explore how investors' uncertainty over financial reporting quality influences firms' voluntary disclosures. I consider two shocks that cause investors to assign a higher likelihood of restatement and examine how managers respond using voluntary disclosures. Managers inform stakeholders of the firm through mandatory disclosures (e.g. financial statements) and voluntary disclosures (e.g. earnings forecasts, conference calls, press releases). Financial reporting quality represents the extent to which financial statements faithfully reflect the underlying economics of the firm, and therefore, how much stakeholders can learn from these mandatory disclosures alone. The focus of this thesis is on how managers use voluntary channels to inform stakeholders following shocks to investors' expectations of financial reporting quality.

Description

Type of resource text
Form electronic; electronic resource; remote
Extent 1 online resource.
Publication date 2016
Issuance monographic
Language English

Creators/Contributors

Associated with Floyd, William F
Associated with Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
Primary advisor McNichols, Maureen, 1953-
Thesis advisor McNichols, Maureen, 1953-
Thesis advisor Marinovic, Iván
Thesis advisor Piotroski, Joseph D. (Joseph David)
Advisor Marinovic, Iván
Advisor Piotroski, Joseph D. (Joseph David)

Subjects

Genre Theses

Bibliographic information

Statement of responsibility William F. Floyd.
Note Submitted to the Graduate School of Business.
Thesis Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2016.
Location electronic resource

Access conditions

Copyright
© 2016 by William Floyd
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).

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