Choosing Between Prevention and Catastrophe: Analyzing the Transformative Shift from Biodefense to Biosecurity Policy

American biodefense policy was initiated following the 2001 Anthrax Attacks. Over the next thirteen years, policy enacted regarding biological threats and security measures shifted towards a biosecurity focus. Biosecurity is a broader concept that focuses on the nexus between health and security in order to combat a multitude of biological threats. This thesis analyzes two contradicting theories explaining this shift, in order to predict future trends: driving events, and changing landscapes.

The notion of driving events, that policy is created as a direct or indirect result of specific events, best explains the shift to bioterrorism policy in the early 2000s. However, the changing nature of the biological threat landscape cannot be overlooked in providing justification for this shift in policy. Rapid urbanization coupled with poor infrastructure, land use changes, increased international changes and climate change have had drastic impacts on the frequency and severity of infectious disease outbreaks over the last decade. These factors have continued to impact the frequency and pathology of emerging infectious diseases.

Biosecurity policy has become the default for American biological policy. Despite this, evidence suggests that another driving event would undoubtedly cause policymakers and politicians to revert back to bioterrorism policy. This characterization of this shift is a policy imperative, and cannot be taken lightly. In considering limited resource allocation, the government should be wary that any reactive bioterrorism investments in response to terror events could be an uneconomical venture, as policy is likely to default to biosecurity in the long run.