Landmark Success or Colossal Failure? Exploring the Potential for Success of the Iran Nuclear Deal

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a nuclear arms control agreement between six world powers and Iran, has led to an enormous amount of controversy around the world. The deal is the result of more than a decade of informal diplomacy and two years of formal negotiations, and it marks the first diplomatic engagement between the United States and Iran since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Skeptics of the deal argue that the agreement includes neither proper verification nor incentives for an untrustworthy Iran to cooperate, and is thereby doomed to fail.
This thesis investigates why countries comply with agreements that involve reducing the nuclear capabilities that safeguard national security. By analyzing factors that influence cooperation with nuclear arms control agreements, this thesis explores the potential for success of the JCPOA. Three factors in particular, are relevant to predicting cooperation with an agreement: (1) verification measures focused on technological capabilities and dispute resolution mechanisms, (2) negotiations and the development of personal relationships between leaders, and (3) domestic political context. This thesis studies three agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, along with the JCPOA. Using the above factors as analytical prisms to understand the case studies, this thesis evaluates the contribution of each factor to the potential for success of the deal. Ultimately, this thesis suggests that verification is necessary in agreements, but not sufficient in predicting their success. Domestic political context does not make or break a deal. Negotiations, while hardest to quantify, appear most important; particularly, personal relationships that develop through informal channels are salient in determining the potential for success of a nuclear arms control agreement.