Motives as the heart of ethics and agency

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract
This work situates motives at the heart of a number of longstanding themes for ethics and agency. I begin by advancing the thesis that motives have intrinsic significance independent of outcomes: while one moral standard of rightness assesses acts according to their outcomes, a second standard assesses acts according to the motives underlying them. The dualism of being for what matters and bringing about what matters is central to ethics. I also argue that agents directly control their motives. Whereas many philosophers think that we can control our motives only indirectly, by acting on them, I hold to the contrary that this basic control over motives is what facilitates control over actions in the first place. My position implies that morality might place daunting demands on motivational capacities, an extreme example being that you ought to love your enemy. Given that your enemy may merit hate, however, the grounds for such love must lie in your own background experiences with unmerited love.

Description

Type of resource text
Form electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource
Extent 1 online resource.
Place California
Place [Stanford, California]
Publisher [Stanford University]
Copyright date 2023; ©2023
Publication date 2023; 2023
Issuance monographic
Language English

Creators/Contributors

Author McDougal, Austen Drew
Degree supervisor Wenar, Leif
Thesis advisor Wenar, Leif
Thesis advisor Bobonich, Christopher
Thesis advisor Dannenberg, Jorah, 1979-
Thesis advisor Hussain, Nadeem J. Z
Thesis advisor Maguire, Barry
Degree committee member Bobonich, Christopher
Degree committee member Dannenberg, Jorah, 1979-
Degree committee member Hussain, Nadeem J. Z
Degree committee member Maguire, Barry
Associated with Stanford University, School of Humanities and Sciences
Associated with Stanford University, Department of Philosophy

Subjects

Genre Theses
Genre Text

Bibliographic information

Statement of responsibility Austen McDougal.
Note Submitted to the Department of Philosophy.
Thesis Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2023.
Location https://purl.stanford.edu/gh636cn5164

Access conditions

Copyright
© 2023 by Austen Drew McDougal
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).

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