Procedural constraints on agency rulemaking : an analysis of political control of the bureaucracy
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- The bureaucracy literature has long analyzed political control of administrative agencies. Such studies typically ask to what extent the president, the Congress, the courts, and interest groups influence the regulatory process? This dissertation analyzes an important but overlooked element of political control: statutory constraints on the rulemaking process such as the Administrative Procedures Act's notice and comment requirement. Almost all existing studies assume that such constraints are effective, or achieve the goals of their supporters. This assumption neglects the influence of politics, however. This dissertation challenges the conventional wisdom by analyzing the impact of politics on the likelihood that a rulemaking process constraint will be effective. Chapter 1 explains the problem and reviews the literature, showing that many studies have incorrectly assumed that all rulemaking process constraints are effective. Chapter 2 argues that opponents of proposed constraints can win concessions that undermine the odds that a constraint will be effective. Chapter 3 tests this theory with case studies of the full universe of generally applicable statutory rulemaking constraints. The chapter also analyzes whether constraints increase the amount of time required to complete a rulemaking. Contrary to common expectations, some constraints are wildly ineffective. Chapter 4 discusses the implications. The results offer new evidence regarding the extent to which the administrative process responds to the Congress, president, and courts. The results also provide insight into the goals of Congress and the president with respect to administrative law. In concluding, Chapter 5 discusses future research directions.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Form | electronic; electronic resource; remote |
| Extent | 1 online resource. |
| Publication date | 2010 |
| Issuance | monographic |
| Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
| Associated with | Raso, Connor N |
|---|---|
| Associated with | Stanford University, Department of Political Science. |
| Primary advisor | Moe, Terry M |
| Thesis advisor | Moe, Terry M |
| Thesis advisor | Cohen, Joshua |
| Thesis advisor | Ferejohn, John A |
| Thesis advisor | Eskridge, William N, Jr, 1951- |
| Advisor | Cohen, Joshua |
| Advisor | Ferejohn, John A |
| Advisor | Eskridge, William N, Jr, 1951- |
Subjects
| Genre | Theses |
|---|
Bibliographic information
| Statement of responsibility | Connor N. Raso. |
|---|---|
| Note | Submitted to the Department of Political Science. |
| Thesis | Ph.D. Stanford University 2010 |
| Location | electronic resource |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2010 by Connor N Raso
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
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