"A Different Kettle of Fish": OPEC's Impact on Oil Nationalization, Political Accountability, and Governance

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract
Academic literature and scholarship surrounding the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the effects of oil nationalization evaluate the two separately. Econometric analyses debate OPEC’s ability to control prices according to dominant cartel theory and question OPEC’s relevance economically (Rose 2004). Studies of the effects of natural resource nationalization emphasize the regional effects, without considering the socio-political effects of OPEC membership. My research bridges this gap by asking: for countries with nationalized oil programs, how has membership in OPEC affected political accountability? OPEC membership for countries with nationalized oil programs may provide the collateral for resource-rich countries to bargain for their own oil interests and profit. In my thesis, I evaluate two pairs of countries which nationalized their oil industries; in each pair, one country joined OPEC, whereas the other did not. One pair, Nigeria and Bolivia, represent countries with conflict that preceded nationalization; the other pair, Argentina and Iran, represent two countries that nationalized in the 1950s. I compare both sets of cases’ political accountability before and after oil nationalization and also relative to dates the country joined OPEC. I utilize primary and secondary materials, including historical accounts, interviews, and various archives to understand the trajectory of a country before nationalizing their oil program and the implications of the nationalization event on political accountability. My thesis draws on sources from the UK National Archives in Kew, England, the Lyndon B Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, Texas, and the Hoover Library in Stanford, California. This archival research contextualizes the relevance of sovereignty over natural resources and contemporary debates surrounding the impact of OPEC for global petroleum markets. I find that countries that joined OPEC have fewer institutions of political accountability than countries that never joined OPEC. I also present possible explanations for this finding, including that countries that nationalized and never joined OPEC did so due to domestic political pressure, which solidified channels of political accountability. Countries that did join OPEC nationalized their oil reserves due pressure from international interests, and did not create or support methods of political accountability in the process.

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Type of resource text
Date created May 15, 2024
Date modified May 29, 2024; May 29, 2024
Publication date May 15, 2024; May 15, 2024

Creators/Contributors

Author Nicolson, Bailey
Thesis advisor Kennard, Amanda
Degree granting institution Stanford University, Department of International Relations

Subjects

Subject Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
Subject Oil Nationalization
Subject Seven Sisters
Subject Political Accountability
Subject Program in International Relations
Genre Text
Genre Thesis

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY).

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Preferred citation
Nicolson, B. (2024). "A Different Kettle of Fish": OPEC's Impact on Oil Nationalization, Political Accountability, and Governance. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at https://purl.stanford.edu/fv004sd6042. https://doi.org/10.25740/fv004sd6042.

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Stanford University, Program in International Relations, Honors Theses

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