Essays on business and politics

<a href="https://embed.stanford.edu/iframe/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fpurl.stanford.edu%2Ffj675wt9275" class="su-underline">Show Content</a>

Abstract/Contents

Abstract: This dissertation consists of three essays on the subjects of business and politics, with each analyzing key tensions and interactions between various business and political agents. Chapter 1 theorizes about how firms use their business, operations, or market strategy decisions as a lobbying instrument, to influence political decision-makers. I also contrast this with conventional monetary lobbying and determine the reasons why firm may prefer to lobby one way over another. Chapter 2 examines how firms with intrinsically long time-horizons overcome the short-run performance pressures on management through corporate governance. I develop a theory for why long-horizon firms should exhibit greater governance insulation than short-horizon firms, and empirically validate the theory for an important set of anti-takeover provisions. Chapter 3 explores how the durability of policy interacts with the shorter electoral cycle and provides incentives for politicians to engage in wasteful and inefficient policy-making.

Type of resource	text
Form	electronic; electronic resource; remote
Extent	1 online resource.
Publication date	2013
Issuance	monographic
Language	English

Associated with	Raiha, Davin
Associated with	Stanford University, School of Business Administration.
Primary advisor	Callander, Steven
Thesis advisor	Callander, Steven
Thesis advisor	Baron, David, P
Thesis advisor	Shotts, Kenneth W
Advisor	Baron, David, P
Advisor	Shotts, Kenneth W

Genre	Theses

Statement of responsibility	Davin Raiha.
Note	Submitted to the School of Business Administration.
Thesis	Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2013.
Location	electronic resource

License: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).

View in SearchWorks

Loading usage metrics...