Space, mind, and discursive knowledge
- Two major philosophical debates are explored - one concerning the reality of space, and one concerning the physicality of qualia. What binds these explorations together is a set of observations Kant made concerning incongruent counterparts. Chapter 1 presents a novel reformulation of Kant's attempt to refute the relational theory of space using these observations. I argue that standard relationist replies fail to engage his 'handless body' thought-experiment, by treating the body as enantiomorphic rather than homomorphic. I then present novel relational replies to Kant's argument as properly understood. In Chapter 2 presents a novel refutation of Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument (KA). I consider the advances made by John Perry and Torin Alter in identifying the 'discursive learnability' assumption central to KA. I show that this 'discursive learnability' criterion for physical facts must be rejected because straightforwardly physical facts about 'parity-violating' phenomena are not discursively learnable, and I substantiate this claim using Kant's observations about incongruent counterparts. Chapter 3 presents a critique of some popular strategies for rejecting KA, including those of David Lewis, Brian Loar, and Daniel Stoljar. I also propose a distinction between two ways that words fail to communicate concepts and knowledge, and suggest that this clarifies the debate concerning KA.
|Type of resource
|electronic; electronic resource; remote
|1 online resource.
|Shanbhag, Praveen Ramesh
|Stanford University, Department of Philosophy.
|Statement of responsibility
|Praveen Ramesh Shanbhag.
|Submitted to the Department of Philosophy.
|Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2014.
- © 2014 by Praveen Ramesh Shanbhag
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