Essays on internet economics and innovation

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract: In this dissertation I study a series of questions in economics of online markets and innovation. In the first chapter, joint work with Zoe Cullen, we study a central economic problem for peer-to-peer online marketplaces: how to create successful matches when demand and supply are highly variable. Specifically, we present and estimate a parsimonious model of a frictional matching market for services, which lets us derive the elasticity of labor demand and supply, the split of surplus between buyers and sellers, and the efficiency with which requests and offers for services are successfully matched. In the second chapter, joint work with Liran Einav, Jonathan Levin, and Neel Sundaresan, we explore the decline of internet auctions in favor of posted prices. We use data from eBay to separate the effect of a shift in buyer demand away from auctions, and the effect of a general narrowing of seller margins due to increased competition. In the third chapter, I test and confirm the positive relationship between patent economic value and citations, an often assumed hypothesis in the economics literature on innovation.

Type of resource	text
Form	electronic; electronic resource; remote
Extent	1 online resource.
Publication date	2015
Issuance	monographic
Language	English

Associated with	Farronato, Chiara
Associated with	Stanford University, Department of Economics.
Primary advisor	Levin, Jonathan
Thesis advisor	Levin, Jonathan
Thesis advisor	Athey, Susan
Thesis advisor	Einav, Liran
Advisor	Athey, Susan
Advisor	Einav, Liran

Genre	Theses

Statement of responsibility	Chiara Farronato.
Note	Submitted to the Department of Economics.
Thesis	Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2015.
Location	electronic resource

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