Contracts and incentives in environmental sustainability
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- As the threats of climate change and environmental degradation worsen, policy makers and non-profits worldwide have developed a plethora of incentive-based solutions that induce environmental efforts from individuals. This dissertation studies these incentive-based solutions using the theoretical modeling tools of contract theory, mechanism design and queueing theory. In the first two sections of this dissertation, I ask how to better design contracts and payment structures to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of environmental payment programs. First, I develop a stylized principal-agent model to study Payment for Ecosystem Services programs, which are used by governments worldwide to pay forest owners to conserve forest. I focus on simple and robust contracts that have performance guarantees even when the government has limited information. Next, I investigate the optimal payment structures in long-term and large-scale afforestation programs with smallholder farmers, finding that paying farmers early can increase the environmental benefits generated per dollar spent. Lastly, motivated by operational challenges in the palm oil value chain, I study the impact of travel delay and real-time announcements on queues at a congested server, finding that travel delay can cause reduction in customer welfare in a queueing system.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Form | electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource |
| Extent | 1 online resource. |
| Place | California |
| Place | [Stanford, California] |
| Publisher | [Stanford University] |
| Copyright date | 2021; ©2021 |
| Publication date | 2021; 2021 |
| Issuance | monographic |
| Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
| Author | Li, Wanyi |
|---|---|
| Degree supervisor | Ashlagi, Itai |
| Degree supervisor | Lo, Irene, (Management science professor) |
| Thesis advisor | Ashlagi, Itai |
| Thesis advisor | Lo, Irene, (Management science professor) |
| Thesis advisor | Weyant, John P. (John Peter) |
| Degree committee member | Weyant, John P. (John Peter) |
| Associated with | Stanford University, Department of Management Science and Engineering |
Subjects
| Genre | Theses |
|---|---|
| Genre | Text |
Bibliographic information
| Statement of responsibility | Wanyi Li. |
|---|---|
| Note | Submitted to the Department of Management Science and Engineering. |
| Thesis | Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2021. |
| Location | https://purl.stanford.edu/dx032nr1384 |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2021 by Wanyi Li
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
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