The Power of the National Security Adviser
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- Given that the national security adviser escapes Congressional approval and oversight and yet yields tremendous influence, it is important to understand why some advisers are more powerful than others. This thesis argues that the managerial style of the president best explains this difference in power. The president has considerable autonomy in establishing the power structure of his administration and can determine how much power the national security adviser will have. The view that the power of the national security adviser relates to the institutional growth of the presidency has merit, but a number of examples show that it is a weak explanation. Weak national security advisers have had many institutional resources (Jones), while strong national security advisers have operated with fewer (Kissinger and Brzezinski). While the personal relationship between the president and the national security adviser are extremely important in the amount of power the adviser has, poor relationships and strong advisers (Nixon and Kissinger) as well as good relationships and weak advisers (Bush and Rice) have occurred in the White House. A good personal relationship is important, but not necessary nor predictive of a strong national security adviser. The managerial style model explains the cases that the institutional growth and personal relationship frameworks cannot. This thesis demonstrates that the national security adviser role is a staff position and exists because the president finds it useful. Why some advisors have more power than others is most influenced by the president’s style of management.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Date created | May 22, 2015 |
Creators/Contributors
| Author | Saba, George |
|---|---|
| Primary advisor | Blacker, Coit D. |
Subjects
| Subject | National Security Adviser |
|---|---|
| Subject | Power |
| Subject | Center for International Security and Cooperation |
| Subject | CISAC |
| Subject | Stanford University |
| Genre | Thesis |
Bibliographic information
Access conditions
- Use and reproduction
- User agrees that, where applicable, content will not be used to identify or to otherwise infringe the privacy or confidentiality rights of individuals. Content distributed via the Stanford Digital Repository may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
Preferred citation
- Preferred Citation
- Saba, George. (2015). The Power of the National Security Adviser. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at: http://purl.stanford.edu/dw756xg9648
Collection
Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Interschool Honors Program in International Security Studies, Theses
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- sabageo24@gmail.com
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