Speaking Truth to Power: Examining the Relationship Between the CIA Director and the President

Since its earliest days, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has grappled with how to position itself relative to the policy process. Though a close relationship between intelligence officers and policymakers can increase understanding and influence on both sides, it can also compromise the objective perspective that the CIA was created to offer.

This thesis seeks to apply this question to the highest levels of government by studying the relationship between the CIA Director and the President. By examining three case studies of nuclear nonproliferation policy since the end of the Cold War, one can determine the ways in which this relationship affects the interactions between intelligence and policy.

It finds that even if the CIA Director and the President have a distant relationship, the bureaucratic nature of the CIA allows the intelligence community to successfully continue to monitor existing threats. Emerging, unknown and particularly complex threats, however, are more effectively handled when the CIA Director and the President have a more intimate relationship. Additionally, because a close relationship between the CIA Director and the President leads to greater influence of intelligence on policy, this relationship needs to be properly structured in order to ensure that the CIA Director does not become a proponent of any specific policy, and instead remains an objective analyst. This thesis concludes with suggestions as to how the CIA Director and President can structure their relationship in the future so that intelligence can best support policymakers in tackling the toughest challenges of our time.