Measuring intentional manipulation : a structural approach

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Using a sample of over 1,800 CEOs in the post-SOX period, I estimate the extent of intentional manipulation and manipulation costs using a dynamic structural model that features a risk-averse manager who receives cash and equity compensation. I find that the expected cost of manipulation is low. The probability of detection is 9%, and the average misstatement results in a 1.5% loss in the manager's wealth. According to the estimated parameters, the implied fraction of manipulating firms is around 63% and the value-weighted bias in the stock price is 2.8%. Among five proxies for earnings management used in the extant literature, only performance-matched discretionary accruals have a positive association with the model-implied measure of intentional manipulation.


Type of resource text
Form electronic; electronic resource; remote
Extent 1 online resource.
Publication date 2012
Issuance monographic
Language English


Associated with Zakolyukina, Anastasia A
Associated with Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
Primary advisor Larcker, David F
Primary advisor Reiss, Peter C. (Peter Clemens)
Thesis advisor Larcker, David F
Thesis advisor Reiss, Peter C. (Peter Clemens)
Thesis advisor Beyer, Anne
Thesis advisor McNichols, Maureen, 1953-
Thesis advisor Piotroski, Joseph D. (Joseph David)
Advisor Beyer, Anne
Advisor McNichols, Maureen, 1953-
Advisor Piotroski, Joseph D. (Joseph David)


Genre Theses

Bibliographic information

Statement of responsibility Anastasia A. Zakolyukina.
Note Submitted to the Graduate School of Business.
Thesis Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2012.
Location electronic resource

Access conditions

© 2012 by Anastasia Zakolyukina
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).

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