Better donors: a non-monetary incentives mechanism to increase kidney market participation
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- Patients that need a kidney transplant and have a potential donor that is not compatible often participate in centralized kidney exchanges to find a match for a successful transplant. A significant challenge for kidney matching exchanges involves the over-representation of patients that are not compatible with most donors. The presence of these highly sensitized patients decreases the number of possible exchanges amongst incompatible pairs, hence decreasing total successful transplants. This paper proposes a non-monetary mechanism that would decrease the sensitivity of kidney exchange pools. Specifically, the mechanism would encourage compatible pairs with old, low sensitivity donors to participate in centralized kidney exchanges with the objective of exchanging the old donor’s kidney with a kidney from a younger donor, hence improving the health outcomes of the patient. The paper uses Monte Carlo simulations to show that, in a kidney exchange pool with real-world characteristics, very two added compatible pairs lead to an additional kidney transplants. Furthermore, the simulations show that 94% of participating compatible pairs were matched with a younger donor. Given 2016 donor demographics, the introduction of this mechanism could have increased US annual paired kidney donations by up to 10%, or 72 new transplants. If implemented, the proposed a mechanism would lead to both an increase the life expectancy of patients from compatible pairs and a significant increase in total kidney transplants - all without any notable tradeoffs.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Date created | May 2017 |
Creators/Contributors
| Author | Mayer-Hirshfeld, Ruben |
|---|---|
| Primary advisor | Clerici-Arias, Marcelo |
| Degree granting institution | Stanford University, Department of Economics |
Subjects
| Subject | Stanford Department of Economics |
|---|---|
| Genre | Thesis |
Bibliographic information
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Preferred citation
- Preferred Citation
- Mayer-Hirshfeld, Ruben. (2017). Better donors: a non-monetary incentives mechanism to increase kidney market participation. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at: https://purl.stanford.edu/cz063fw2404
Collection
Stanford University, Department of Economics, Honors Theses
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