Essays in market and mechanism design
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- This dissertation demonstrates three works to understand how specific markets work and how we can devise the rules to improve market outcome. Chapter 1 studies a two-period matching model where one side of the market (e.g. workers) have an option to invest and delay matching in the first period. Chapter 2 explores the optimal ordering of heterogeneous items in sequential auctions with unit-demand buyers. Chapter 3 analyzes the optimal ``screening'' mechanism of products with network externalities.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Form | electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource |
| Extent | 1 online resource. |
| Place | California |
| Place | [Stanford, California] |
| Publisher | [Stanford University] |
| Copyright date | 2019; ©2019 |
| Publication date | 2019; 2019 |
| Issuance | monographic |
| Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
| Author | Shi, Fanqi |
|---|---|
| Degree supervisor | Kojima, Fuhito |
| Thesis advisor | Kojima, Fuhito |
| Thesis advisor | Jackson, Matthew O |
| Thesis advisor | Roth, Alvin E, 1951- |
| Thesis advisor | Segal, Ilya |
| Degree committee member | Jackson, Matthew O |
| Degree committee member | Roth, Alvin E, 1951- |
| Degree committee member | Segal, Ilya |
| Associated with | Stanford University, Department of Economics. |
Subjects
| Genre | Theses |
|---|---|
| Genre | Text |
Bibliographic information
| Statement of responsibility | Fanqi Shi. |
|---|---|
| Note | Submitted to the Department of Economics. |
| Thesis | Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2019. |
| Location | electronic resource |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2019 by Fanqi Shi
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
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