Essays in market and mechanism design

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This dissertation demonstrates three works to understand how specific markets work and how we can devise the rules to improve market outcome. Chapter 1 studies a two-period matching model where one side of the market (e.g. workers) have an option to invest and delay matching in the first period. Chapter 2 explores the optimal ordering of heterogeneous items in sequential auctions with unit-demand buyers. Chapter 3 analyzes the optimal ``screening'' mechanism of products with network externalities.


Type of resource text
Form electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource
Extent 1 online resource.
Place California
Place [Stanford, California]
Publisher [Stanford University]
Copyright date 2019; ©2019
Publication date 2019; 2019
Issuance monographic
Language English


Author Shi, Fanqi
Degree supervisor Kojima, Fuhito
Thesis advisor Kojima, Fuhito
Thesis advisor Jackson, Matthew O
Thesis advisor Roth, Alvin E, 1951-
Thesis advisor Segal, Ilya
Degree committee member Jackson, Matthew O
Degree committee member Roth, Alvin E, 1951-
Degree committee member Segal, Ilya
Associated with Stanford University, Department of Economics.


Genre Theses
Genre Text

Bibliographic information

Statement of responsibility Fanqi Shi.
Note Submitted to the Department of Economics.
Thesis Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2019.
Location electronic resource

Access conditions

© 2019 by Fanqi Shi
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).

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