Incentives and Manipulation in Large Market Matching with Substitutes
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- The analysis of large two-sided many-to-one matching markets available to date focuses on the class of responsive preferences. This paper gives the first thorough analysis of large market matching under the wider class of substitutable preferences satisfying the Law of Aggregate Demand. We show that the central results of Kojima and Pathak (2009) establishing vanishing incentives to misreport hold under these more general preferences. In doing so, we apply the characterization of stable matchings developed in Hateld and Milgrom (2005) to extend the foundational large market matching theorems not only to more general preferences, but also to arbitrary stable mechanisms. This analysis culminates in the first proof that truthful reporting constitutes an epsilon Nash equilibrium in large markets for all agents under any stable mechanism.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Date created | May 2013 |
Creators/Contributors
| Author | Storms, Evan |
|---|---|
| Primary advisor | Milgrom, Paul |
| Primary advisor | Kojima, Fuhito |
| Degree granting institution | Stanford University, Department of Economics |
Subjects
| Subject | Stanford Department of Economics |
|---|---|
| Subject | Law of Aggregate Demand |
| Subject | large market matching |
| Genre | Thesis |
Bibliographic information
| Related item | |
|---|---|
| Location | https://purl.stanford.edu/ct157nq3189 |
Access conditions
- Use and reproduction
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Preferred citation
- Preferred Citation
- Storms, Evan. (2013). Incentives and Manipulation in Large Market Matching with Substitutes. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at: https://purl.stanford.edu/ct157nq3189
Collection
Stanford University, Department of Economics, Honors Theses
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