Incentives and Manipulation in Large Market Matching with Substitutes

<a href="https://embed.stanford.edu/iframe/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fpurl.stanford.edu%2Fct157nq3189" class="su-underline">Show Content</a>

Abstract/Contents

Abstract: The analysis of large two-sided many-to-one matching markets available to date focuses on the class of responsive preferences. This paper gives the first thorough analysis of large market matching under the wider class of substitutable preferences satisfying the Law of Aggregate Demand. We show that the central results of Kojima and Pathak (2009) establishing vanishing incentives to misreport hold under these more general preferences. In doing so, we apply the characterization of stable matchings developed in Hateld and Milgrom (2005) to extend the foundational large market matching theorems not only to more general preferences, but also to arbitrary stable mechanisms. This analysis culminates in the first proof that truthful reporting constitutes an epsilon Nash equilibrium in large markets for all agents under any stable mechanism.

Type of resource	text
Date created	May 2013

Author	Storms, Evan
Primary advisor	Milgrom, Paul
Primary advisor	Kojima, Fuhito
Degree granting institution	Stanford University, Department of Economics

Subject	Stanford Department of Economics
Subject	Law of Aggregate Demand
Subject	large market matching
Genre	Thesis

Related item	Title 2013 Firestone Medal for Excellence in Undergraduate Research
Location	https://purl.stanford.edu/ct157nq3189

Use and reproduction: User agrees that, where applicable, content will not be used to identify or to otherwise infringe the privacy or confidentiality rights of individuals. Content distributed via the Stanford Digital Repository may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.

Preferred Citation: Storms, Evan. (2013). Incentives and Manipulation in Large Market Matching with Substitutes. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at: https://purl.stanford.edu/ct157nq3189

Stanford University, Department of Economics, Honors Theses

Loading usage metrics...