Prior-independence : a new lens for mechanism design
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- We propose to study revenue-maximizing auctions in the prior-independent analysis framework. The goal is to identify a single auction mechanism for all underlying valuation distributions, so that its expected revenue approximates that of the optimal mechanism tailored for the underlying distribution, under standard weak conditions on the distribution. We use the prior-independent analysis framework to analyze natural and practical auction mechanisms such as welfare-maximization with reserve prices, limiting supply to induce artificial scarcity, sequentially posting prices, etc. Our framework allows us to argue that these simple mechanisms give near-optimal revenue guarantee in a very robust manner.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Form | electronic; electronic resource; remote |
| Extent | 1 online resource. |
| Publication date | 2012 |
| Issuance | monographic |
| Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
| Associated with | Yan, Qiqi |
|---|---|
| Associated with | Stanford University, Computer Science Department |
| Primary advisor | Roughgarden, Tim |
| Thesis advisor | Roughgarden, Tim |
| Thesis advisor | Goel, Ashish |
| Thesis advisor | Plotkin, Serge A |
| Advisor | Goel, Ashish |
| Advisor | Plotkin, Serge A |
Subjects
| Genre | Theses |
|---|
Bibliographic information
| Statement of responsibility | Qiqi Yan. |
|---|---|
| Note | Submitted to the Department of Computer Science. |
| Thesis | Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2012. |
| Location | electronic resource |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2012 by Qiqi Yan
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