A Theory of Non-Democratic Redistribution and Public Good Provision
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- This paper proposes a new theoretical definition of (non-)democracy based on two "political rights" parameters (η , κ) that capture the extensive and intensive margin of the population's ability to replace the incumbent; and an "individual rights" parameter λ that captures the degree to which individual citizens are protected from political retribution. Within the rules of the game specified by (η , κ ), two office-motivated politicians compete for power by making promises to citizens. The policy space features a trade-off between redistribution and public good provision. I study two types of public good: one that delivers egalitarian benefits, the other that delivers non-egalitarian benefits. I find that when political rights are stronger, and/or individual rights are weaker, competition drives politicians to treat citizens more equally, and to provide the egalitarian public good more efficiently. Regimes where political and individual rights are perfectly protected give politicians incentives to treat citizens inequitably for political advantage; these regimes provide the non-egalitarian public goods efficiently.
Description
| Type of resource | text |
|---|---|
| Date created | July 22, 2021 |
Creators/Contributors
| Author | Persico, Nicola |
|---|---|
| Organizer of meeting | Acharya, Avidit |
| Organizer of meeting | Callander, Steve |
| Organizer of meeting | Eraslan, Hülya |
| Organizer of meeting | Foarta, Dana |
| Organizer of meeting | Palfrey, Thomas |
Subjects
| Subject | economics |
|---|---|
| Genre | Text |
| Genre | Working paper |
| Genre | Grey literature |
Bibliographic information
Access conditions
- Use and reproduction
- User agrees that, where applicable, content will not be used to identify or to otherwise infringe the privacy or confidentiality rights of individuals. Content distributed via the Stanford Digital Repository may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY).
Preferred citation
- Preferred citation
- Persico, N. (2022). A Theory of Non-Democratic Redistribution and Public Good Provision. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at https://purl.stanford.edu/cf699yb7349
Collection
SITE Conference 2021
View other items in this collection in SearchWorksContact information
- Contact
- siteworkshop@stanford.edu
Also listed in
Loading usage metrics...