Unruly Proxies: Why States Sponsor Non-State Actors That Threaten Their Interests

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract: Authoritarian regimes in Muslim-majority countries sometimes fund proxy groups at a significant cost to their own stability. States can lose control of the proxy groups they support, or a state’s policy decisions can drive a wedge between the sponsor and the proxy, pitting them against one another. Frequently, and sometimes disastrously, proxy groups “bite the hand that feeds them” and turn on their sponsors. In some cases, the state continues to support a proxy group after the group has defected on its sponsor. These puzzling relationships prompt a question previously unexplored in the literature: Why do states support proxy groups that threaten their interests? In this thesis, I use process-tracing to analyze several case studies involving state support of a proxy that has defected on its sponsor. Ultimately, I conclude that states support non-state actors that threaten their interests when three conditions are present: the relationship between the state and the proxy group is public, the proxy is popular with key domestic coalitions and the general public, and the group is strong enough to retaliate against the state. My research sheds new light on the role of domestic politics in state sponsorship of terrorism.

Type of resource	text
Date created	May 23, 2018

Author	Roberts, Rachel
Advisor	Blaydes, Lisa
Degree granting institution	Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation

Subject	Stanford University
Subject	Center for International Security and Cooperation
Subject	CISAC
Subject	terrorism
Subject	proxies
Subject	sponsorship
Subject	Middle East
Subject	terror financing
Subject	Kashmir
Subject	Fatah
Subject	al-Qaeda
Subject	Saudi Arabia
Subject	Pakistan
Subject	Syria
Subject	Israel
Genre	Thesis

Location	https://purl.stanford.edu/cd804dz6839

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License: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).

Preferred Citation: Roberts, Rachel. (2018). Unruly Proxies: Why States Sponsor Non-State Actors That Threaten Their Interests
. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at: https://purl.stanford.edu/cd804dz6839

Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Interschool Honors Program in International Security Studies, Theses

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