Cryptographic multilinear maps and their applications

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract
Cryptographic multilinear maps are a powerful tool that allows one to perform certain arithmetic operations on encoded values without being able to decode them. The study of multilinear maps was initiated by Boneh and Silverberg in 2003, but it was not until 2013, with the breakthrough works of Garg, Gentry, and Halevi and of Coron, Lepoint, and Tibouchi, that we knew of any candidate constructions. In this thesis, we show that multilinear maps can be used to give new constructions of a number of important cryptographic primitives. We begin with program obfuscation, an extremely powerful primitive that allows one to "scramble" the code of an arbitrary program, so that an adversary cannot learn anything about how it works except by running it. Unlike previous approaches, our construction operates directly on straight-line programs, rather than converting them to matrix branching programs. Because of this, our construction requires only poly(d, s) multilinear map operations for a circuit of depth d and size s---as opposed to previous constructions, for which the number of operations is exponential in d. We also use multilinear maps to construct order-revealing encryption (ORE) with best-possible security. ORE enables one to learn which of any pair of ciphertexts is greater, while leaking no other information. Prior to this work, the best known construction relied on general-purpose two-input functional encryption, which is not currently implementable due to the size of the parameters required. In this work, on the other hand, to compare two 16-bit encrypted values we only need a degree-9 multilinear map. We conclude with a discussion of the cryptanalysis of multilinear maps. In 2014, Cheon, Han, Lee, Ryu, and Stehle presented an attack on the multilinear map of Coron, Lepoint, and Tibouchi (CLT). They show that given many low-level encodings of zero, the CLT multilinear map can be completely broken, recovering the secret factorization of the CLT modulus. The attack is a generalization of the "zeroizing" attack of Garg, Gentry, and Halevi. In this thesis, we strengthen the attack of Cheon et al., by showing that CLT can be broken under some circumstances even without low-level encodings of zero. These new attacks, along with the other contributions of this thesis, further underscore the central importance of developing new kinds of multilinear maps.

Description

Type of resource text
Form electronic; electronic resource; remote
Extent 1 online resource.
Publication date 2017
Issuance monographic
Language English

Creators/Contributors

Associated with Zimmerman, Joseph Paul
Associated with Stanford University, Computer Science Department.
Primary advisor Boneh, Dan
Thesis advisor Boneh, Dan
Thesis advisor Valiant, Gregory
Thesis advisor Williams, Ryan (Richard Ryan)
Advisor Valiant, Gregory
Advisor Williams, Ryan (Richard Ryan)

Subjects

Genre Theses

Bibliographic information

Statement of responsibility Joseph Paul Zimmerman.
Note Submitted to the Department of Computer Science.
Thesis Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2017.
Location electronic resource

Access conditions

Copyright
© 2017 by Joseph Paul Zimmerman
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license (CC BY).

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