Essays in innovation and entrepreneurship

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract
In this thesis, I study sources of innovation and the choices established firms, researchers/entrepreneurs, and venture capitalist make when pursuing innovation. There are three main sources of innovation. First, an innovation can be produced by researchers working inside a large firm. Second, it can result from a collaboration among established firms, researchers, and entrepreneurial start-ups. Finally, an innovation can be created by a start-up. In the latter case, the successful start-up can be either acquired by an established firm or continue to be a stand-alone company. In most cases such a start-up needs to raise outside funding, which is often provided by a venture capital fund. Chapter 1 considers the choices firms and researchers/entrepreneurs make when deciding to pursue innovation together. In this chapter I use an incomplete contracting framework to model the choice between three innovation strategies: an acquisition, an employment contract, and an alliance. Each of these options comes with different contracting frictions that lead to distortions in the agents' innovation effort levels. The agents choose the innovation strategy that maximizes their joint surplus by minimizing the effect of these distortions. In particular, the agents are trading off the hold-up costs characterizing acquisitions, wage restrictions in employment contracts, and possible IP rights conflicts in alliances. My theoretical model generates predictions about the organizational structures used to innovate, and can explain (1) why talent acquisitions were popular among tech companies in 2010--14, (2) why large pharmaceutical companies switched from conducting research internally to pursuing acquisitions, alliances, and licensing agreements, and (3) why some companies engage in alliances, while others don't. Chapter 2 considers start-ups and their origins. I find that people who work in VC-backed start-ups are more likely to become founders of VC-backed start-ups than employees of public companies or private companies not financed by venture capital. I also show that founders come from more successful VC-backed companies. Finally, workers leave their current employment to start new companies: after an IPO or after a failure of a VC-backed company to raise another round of funding. Chapter 3 considers one of the important decisions made by venture capitalists and other partnerships. In this chapter I model the choice of the optimal number of partners. As more partners join, the profits of the partnership grow due to synergy. However, each partner's share of the profits shrinks leading to moral hazard. In addition, as the founder needs to find more partners, it becomes harder to find good candidates and the type of the marginal partner decreases. The model suggests that higher benefits from starting a fund, faster decreasing type of a marginal partner and higher type of the founder can potentially explain why VC funds are smaller than professional service firms.

Description

Type of resource text
Form electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource
Extent 1 online resource.
Place California
Place [Stanford, California]
Publisher [Stanford University]
Copyright date 2018; ©2018
Publication date 2018; 2018
Issuance monographic
Language English

Creators/Contributors

Author Anosova, Daria
Degree supervisor Strebulaev, I. A. (Ilʹi͡a Alekseevich)
Thesis advisor Strebulaev, I. A. (Ilʹi͡a Alekseevich)
Thesis advisor Hodrick, L. S. (Laurie Simon)
Thesis advisor Zwiebel, Jeffrey
Degree committee member Hodrick, L. S. (Laurie Simon)
Degree committee member Zwiebel, Jeffrey
Associated with Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.

Subjects

Genre Theses
Genre Text

Bibliographic information

Statement of responsibility Daria Anosova.
Note Submitted to the Graduate School of Business.
Thesis Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2018.
Location electronic resource

Access conditions

Copyright
© 2018 by Daria Anosova
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).

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