How does politics affect central banking? : evidence from the Federal Reserve
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- My dissertation investigates the ways in which political dynamics influence decision-making at central banks. I address this question by looking at the different mechanisms through which political influence occurs. I devote a chapter to examining this topic in each of the following contexts: the evolution of the structure of the Federal Reserve, the preferences of monetary policymakers around elections, and the Federal Reserve's lending during the 2008 financial crisis. Through this series of chapters, I find that politicians designed the American central bank in such a way that political considerations are able to consistently affect monetary policymakers. However, stemming from the partial compromises inherent in its design, this influence is constrained in such a way to ensure its stability, as too much would lead to a new equilibrium in which the central bank is more apolitical.
Description
Type of resource | text |
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Form | electronic; electronic resource; remote |
Extent | 1 online resource. |
Publication date | 2015 |
Issuance | monographic |
Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
Associated with | Puente, Lucas |
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Associated with | Stanford University, Department of Political Science. |
Primary advisor | Haber, Stephen H, 1957- |
Thesis advisor | Haber, Stephen H, 1957- |
Thesis advisor | Hainmueller, Jens |
Thesis advisor | Weingast, Barry R |
Advisor | Hainmueller, Jens |
Advisor | Weingast, Barry R |
Subjects
Genre | Theses |
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Bibliographic information
Statement of responsibility | Lucas Puente. |
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Note | Submitted to the Department of Political Science. |
Thesis | Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2015. |
Location | electronic resource |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2015 by Lucas Llanso Puente
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
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