How does politics affect central banking? : evidence from the Federal Reserve

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract
My dissertation investigates the ways in which political dynamics influence decision-making at central banks. I address this question by looking at the different mechanisms through which political influence occurs. I devote a chapter to examining this topic in each of the following contexts: the evolution of the structure of the Federal Reserve, the preferences of monetary policymakers around elections, and the Federal Reserve's lending during the 2008 financial crisis. Through this series of chapters, I find that politicians designed the American central bank in such a way that political considerations are able to consistently affect monetary policymakers. However, stemming from the partial compromises inherent in its design, this influence is constrained in such a way to ensure its stability, as too much would lead to a new equilibrium in which the central bank is more apolitical.

Description

Type of resource text
Form electronic; electronic resource; remote
Extent 1 online resource.
Publication date 2015
Issuance monographic
Language English

Creators/Contributors

Associated with Puente, Lucas
Associated with Stanford University, Department of Political Science.
Primary advisor Haber, Stephen H, 1957-
Thesis advisor Haber, Stephen H, 1957-
Thesis advisor Hainmueller, Jens
Thesis advisor Weingast, Barry R
Advisor Hainmueller, Jens
Advisor Weingast, Barry R

Subjects

Genre Theses

Bibliographic information

Statement of responsibility Lucas Puente.
Note Submitted to the Department of Political Science.
Thesis Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2015.
Location electronic resource

Access conditions

Copyright
© 2015 by Lucas Llanso Puente
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).

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