Precaution in the private interest
Abstract/Contents
- Abstract
- What determines how the regulation of risk changes over time? This dissertation develops and tests a theory to explain regulatory change at both national and international levels of governance. Beginning with the observation that the regulation of risk centers on a problem of asymmetric information between the regulator and the party being regulated, I proceed to elucidate how this informational asymmetry informs the regulatory institutions that are implemented, as well as the regulatory outcomes that result. In particular, I show how producers of potentially dangerous products leverage their informational advantages in order to acquire regulations that push their less profitable products off the market in favor of more profitable alternatives. Surprisingly, precautionary institutions intended to make regulatory standards more responsive to science and new information end up helping these producers use information to their advantage. Notably, because producers' ability to win favorable regulations results from their informational, as opposed to their political, influence, producers have been as successful at winning preferential regulatory outcomes at the international level as they have at the national one. My findings have implications for global welfare as well as for scholars' theoretical understanding of the conditions under which national and international bodies do and do not produce divergent outcomes.
Description
Type of resource | text |
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Form | electronic resource; remote; computer; online resource |
Extent | 1 online resource. |
Place | California |
Place | [Stanford, California] |
Publisher | [Stanford University] |
Copyright date | 2019; ©2019 |
Publication date | 2019; 2019 |
Issuance | monographic |
Language | English |
Creators/Contributors
Author | Perlman, Rebecca Louise | |
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Degree supervisor | Goldstein, Judith | |
Thesis advisor | Goldstein, Judith | |
Thesis advisor | Haber, Stephen H, 1957- | |
Thesis advisor | Moe, Terry | |
Thesis advisor | Tomz, Michael | |
Degree committee member | Haber, Stephen H, 1957- | |
Degree committee member | Moe, Terry | |
Degree committee member | Tomz, Michael | |
Associated with | Stanford University, Department of Political Science |
Subjects
Genre | Theses |
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Genre | Text |
Bibliographic information
Statement of responsibility | Rebecca Perlman. |
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Note | Submitted to the Department of Political Science. |
Thesis | Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2019. |
Location | https://purl.stanford.edu/yy606gq9488 |
Access conditions
- Copyright
- © 2019 by Rebecca Louise Perlman
- License
- This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).
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