Bargaining and Typology: A Theory of Economic Sanctions Success

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract: Under what conditions do the senders of economic sanctions achieve their policy goals? Scholars and policy makers fixate on the punitive capacity of sanctions, but the costs sanctions impose on targets is only one of several factors that determine episode outcomes. This thesis advances a bargaining framework for sanctions episodes that identifies nine political and economic variables that influence sanctions efficacy. I assert that, in addition to those factors commonly addressed by sanctions scholars, sanctions type impacts the likelihood of bargaining between senders and targets. Then, I statistically analyze 165 sanctions episodes since World War II to demonstrate the bargaining framework’s viability. Finally, I explore the analytical and practical implications of my research. Chiefly, I argue that if sender states are unwilling to compromise with adversarial targets over major policy goals, sanctions alone are unlikely to succeed.

Type of resource	text
Date created	May 28, 2008

Author	Chaitkin, Michael
Advisor	Stedman, Stephen J.

Subject	Center for International Security and Cooperation
Subject	CISAC
Subject	sanctions
Subject	bargaining framework
Genre	Thesis

Location	https://purl.stanford.edu/nh709fw7090

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License: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).

Preferred Citation: Chaitkin, Michael. (2008). Bargaining and Typology: A Theory of Economic Sanctions Success. Stanford Digital Repository. Available at: http://purl.stanford.edu/nh709fw7090

Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Interschool Honors Program in International Security Studies, Theses

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