Persistence and Recurrence of  Internal Armed Conflict

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Abstract/Contents

Abstract: This thesis analyzes factors that affect the duration and relapse of internal armed conflicts. I use a data set containing 173 conflicts that occurred worldwide between 1946 and 2008. I find that ethnically diverse, poor, and populous countries are prone to persistent and recurrent internal conflict. I find that decisive victories tend to be more stable than agreements, which in turn are more stable than conflicts that end due to low activity. My research indicates that peacekeepers are highly effective in reducing the chances that a conflict will relapse. Through a set of case studies focused on recurrence, I determine that countries with a large plurality ethnic group and several smaller groups are prone to recurrent conflict. In a second set of case studies, I argue that exogenous support for rebel organizations is crucial to sustaining many persistent conflicts. I stress that negotiators and policymakers must be acutely aware of the risks of recurrence when mediating internal conflicts. I recommend the deployment of peacekeepers to enforce agreements and the inclusion of ethnic minorities in government, especially in situations at high risk of relapse. Finally, I argue that isolating and neutralizing exogenous support for rebels is critical to ending persistent conflicts.

Type of resource	text
Date created	May 18, 2010

Author	Cassman, Daniel R.
Advisor	Fearon, James

Subject	CISAC
Subject	Center for International Security and Cooperation
Subject	Stanford University
Subject	internal conflict
Subject	security
Genre	Thesis

Location	https://purl.stanford.edu/hh223mq2639

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License: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC).

Preferred Citation: Cassman, Daniel R. (2010). Persistence and Recurrence of Internal Armed Conflict . Stanford Digital Repository. Available at: http://purl.stanford.edu/hh223mq2639

Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Interschool Honors Program in International Security Studies, Theses

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